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Summary
Human social interaction requires the recognition that
other people are governed by the same types ofmental
states—beliefs, desires, intentions—that guide one’s
own behavior. We used functional neuroimaging to
examine how perceivers make mental state inferences
when such self-other overlap can be assumed (when
the other is similar to oneself) and when it cannot
(when the other is dissimilar from oneself). We ob-
served a double dissociation such that mentalizing
about a similar other engaged a region of ventral
mPFC linked to self-referential thought, whereas men-
talizing about a dissimilar other engaged amore dorsal
subregion of mPFC. The overlap between judgments
of self and similar others suggests the plausibility of
‘‘simulation’’ accounts of social cognition, which posit
that perceivers can use knowledge about themselves
to infer the mental states of others.
Introduction
Any attempt at understanding the behavior of another
person requires a consideration of the rich set of internal
mental states that govern what others do and say.
Adopting this kind of ‘‘intentional stance’’ requires the
recognition that others are mental agents that act pri-
marily on the basis of what they believe, feel, and desire
(Dennett, 1987). Moreover, human social cognition in-
cludes the added appreciation that others not only ex-
perience beliefs, feelings, and desires, but that their
mental states are generally comparable to those experi-
enced by oneself, a cognitive ability that appears to dis-
tinguish humans from other primates (Tomasello, 1999).
This unique awareness that the inner workings of others’
minds overlap meaningfully with one’s own allows hu-
mans to use their own thoughts and feelings as a guide
to those of others. Indeed, ‘‘simulation’’ (or ‘‘projection’’)
theories of social cognition have posited that perceivers
may infer mental states, in part, by assuming that others
experience what they themselves would think or feel in
a comparable situation (Adolphs, 2002; Davies and
Stone, 1995a, 1995b; Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Gor-
*Correspondence: mitchell@wjh.harvard.edudon, 1992; Heal, 1986; Meltzoff and Brooks, 2001; Nick-
erson, 1999).
Critically, this strategy of basing inferences about
others on knowledge about oneself will be useful only
to the extent that one can assume that the other is likely
to experience the same mental states as oneself. If a tar-
get of mentalizing is substantially different from oneself
(e.g., somebody from another culture or ethnic group),
using self knowledge to inform such inferences may be
relatively less useful. As such, simulationist accounts
of social cognition suggest that perceivers will mentalize
in a different way when the other is perceived to be sim-
ilar to versus dissimilar from oneself.
Although considerable neuroimaging (Frith and Frith,
1999; Gallagher and Frith, 2003) and neuropsychological
(Gregory et al., 2002; Stuss et al., 2001) research has
demonstrated that inferences about another’s mental
states rely on medial aspects of prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), few attempts have been made to identify func-
tionally discrete subregions within mPFC that may con-
tribute to differences in the ways mentalizing takes
place. Nevertheless, extant data on the neural basis of
social cognition provide some preliminary support for
the possibility that mPFC contributions to mentalizing
may differ according to the perceived overlap between
self and other. Although most studies have linked mental
state inferences to modulation of dorsal regions of
mPFC (Castelli et al., 2000; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gal-
lagher et al., 2000, 2002; Goel et al., 1995; Kumaran
and Maguire, 2005; Mitchell et al., 2004, 2005a, 2005b;
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), some of these studies
have also reported the engagement of an additional,
ventral mPFC region during social-cognitive tasks (Gal-
lagher et al., 2000, 2002; Kumaran and Maguire, 2005;
Mitchell et al., 2005a) that is especially pronounced for
one’s friends (Kumaran and Maguire, 2005) or similar
others (Mitchell et al., 2005a). As yet, little is understood
about the specific contributions made by each of these
mPFC subregions to social cognition.
However, an important clue regarding the functional
distinction between these two regions has recently
come from studies of self-referential processing, which
have consistently observed selective engagement of
ventral mPFC during tasks that require reporting one’s
own internal states. This ventral mPFC region (typically,
within a few millimeters of the axial plane of the genu of
the corpus callosum) has been linked to a variety of
self-referential tasks (Northoff et al., 2006) such as re-
porting on one’s preferences or personality (Johnson
et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004;
Moran et al., 2006; Schmitz et al., 2004; Zysset et al.,
2002), reflecting on one’s current affective state
(Gusnard et al., 2001), or adopting a first-person per-
spective (Vogeley et al., 2004). Typically, dorsal mPFC
activation has not been modulated during self-referenc-
ing tasks.
Taken together, the dual observations that ventral
mPFC is engaged occasionally during mentalizing and
consistently during self-referential processing support
the notion that this region may subserve inferences
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when mental state inferences are informed by per-
ceivers’ knowledge about their own feelings and
thoughts. If so, simulation theories of social cognition
suggest that this region should be specifically engaged
for mental state inferences about others perceived to
be similar to oneself, since mentalizing on the basis of
self knowledge can only take place if another person’s
internal experience is assumed to be comparable to
one’s own. As such, this hypothesis suggests an impor-
tant ‘‘division of labor’’ in the contributions made by
different subregions of mPFC to mentalizing. Whereas
ventral mPFC may be expected to contribute to mental
state inferences about similar others, the dorsal aspects
of mPFC—more traditionally associated with mentaliz-
ing tasks—should be specifically engaged by mentaliz-
ing about dissimilar others, that is, individuals for
whom overlap between self and other cannot be
assumed.
To test these predictions, we first had participants
read descriptions of two unfamiliar individuals who
were described as having opposing liberal or conserva-
tive sociopolitical views (see Experimental Procedures
section). This manipulation was intended to create one
target whose social and political views would be similar
to those of the participant and another target whose
views would be dissimilar. During functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) scanning, participants men-
talized about the opinions, likes, and dislikes of each
of these two targets and also indicated their own re-
sponses on the same set of opinion questions. After
scanning, participants completed a version of the Im-
plicit Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald et al., 1998), de-
signed to index how strongly they automatically associ-
ated ‘‘self’’ with the liberal target versus the conservative
target. Participants also completed a version of the IAT
that measured their automatic evaluation of each target
(positive versus negative) and, finally, reported their ex-
plicit social and political attitudes on a seven-point scale
(1 = extremely liberal; 4 = neither liberal nor conserva-
tive; 7 = extremely conservative).
Figure 1. IAT Response Latency Differences for Each Participant
Difference values were obtained by subtracting the mean response
latency to trials in the self-with-liberal block from the mean response
latency to trials in the self-with-conservative block. Thus, higher
values indicate faster responses when first-person pronouns were
paired with the liberal target, and thus suggest a stronger associa-
tion between self and the liberal target. On the basis of these results,
participants were retroactively assigned to either the ‘‘dissimilar
from liberal’’ or ‘‘similar to liberal’’ participant group.Results
Behavioral Data
Participants were significantly faster to make judgments
of self (M = 1863 ms) than judgments of others (M = 1927
ms), t(14) = 2.89, p < 0.02. In addition, participants
judged liberal targets more quickly on average than con-
servative targets (Ms = 1907 and 1947 ms, respectively)
t(14) = 2.21, p < 0.05.
On the two postscanning self-report measures, par-
ticipants explicitly reported having relatively liberal so-
cial (M = 2.93, SD = 1.71) and political (M = 2.80, SD =
1.42) attitudes. As expected, responses on these two
explicit questions were highly correlated, r(14) = 0.93.
Consistent with this liberal outlook, results from the
postscanning IAT session indicated that participants
were, as a group, significantly faster to categorize trials
in self-with-liberal blocks (M = 610 ms) than trials in self-
with-conservative blocks (M = 669 ms), t(14) = 2.67, p <
0.02, demonstrating that, on average, participants more
strongly associated self with the liberal than the conser-
vative target. However, sizeable variability across par-
ticipants was observed in the response latency differ-
ence between the two blocks of the IAT, with some
participants showing a stronger association be-
tween self and the conservative target (SD = 85.9,
range = 265.8 to 244.2 ms). We used this variability to
segregate participants into two groups (Figure 1).
Specifically, based on a median split of their IAT differ-
ence score, participants were assigned either to the
‘‘similar to liberal’’ (n = 8, mean IAT difference = 120.2
ms, SD = 63.8) or ‘‘dissimilar from liberal’’ (n = 7, mean
IAT difference = 212.8 ms, SD = 38.6) group.
Importantly, this participant group factor did not inter-
act with the reaction time advantage for liberal targets.
Participants were equally fast to judge similar targets
(i.e., the liberal target for participants in the ‘‘similar to
liberal’’ group and the conservative target for partici-
pants in the ‘‘dissimilar from liberal’’ group) than to judge
dissimilar targets (Ms 1924 and 1929 ms, respectively),
t(14) = 0.49, p = 0.63.
fMRI Data
fMRI data were subjected to a random-effects analysis
that included participant group factor (similar to liberal,
dissimilar from liberal) in order to identify brain regions
that demonstrated a significant interaction of participant
group 3 target (liberal, conservative). This analysis re-
vealed two discrete regions in mPFC. First, a ventral
mPFC region (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: 18, 57,
9) was more engaged during judgments of the target
with whom participants more strongly associated them-
selves as measured by the IAT (Figure 2A). That is, par-
ticipants in the ‘‘similar to liberal’’ group demonstrated
greater engagement of ventral mPFC while making men-
talizing judgments of the liberal target, whereas partici-
pants in the ‘‘dissimilar from liberal’’ group demon-
strated greater ventral mPFC engagement while
judging the conservative target. Several additional re-
gions—right inferior frontal gyrus, cingulate cortex,
and bilateral occipital cortex—were also obtained from
this analysis and demonstrated greater activation for
similar than dissimilar targets (see Table 1).
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657Figure 2. Medial Prefrontal Regions Ob-
tained from Random-Effects Analysis of the
Interaction of Participant Group (Similar to
Liberal, Dissimilar from Liberal)3 Target (Lib-
eral Other, Conservative Other)
(A) A region of ventral mPFC showed greater
activation during judgments of the target to
whom participants considered themselves
to be more similar. For participants who as-
sociated self with the liberal target (left set
of bars), the response of the ventral mPFC
was higher for liberal targets (middle, blue
bar) than conservative targets (rightmost,
red bar), and no difference was observed for
judgments of self (leftmost, green bar) and
the liberal target. In contrast, for participants
who did not associate with the liberal target
(right set of bars), the response of ventral
mPFC was higher for conservative than lib-
eral targets, and no difference was observed
for judgments of self and the conservative
target.
(B) A region of dorsal mPFC showed the op-
posite pattern of results, that is, greater acti-
vation during judgments of the target from
whom participants considered themselves
to be dissimilar.In contrast, activation in dorsal mPFC (peak voxel:29,
45, 42) was greater during judgments of the target with
whom participants less strongly associated themselves
(Figure 2B). That is, participants in the ‘‘similar to liberal’’
group demonstrated greater engagement of dorsal
mPFC while making judgments of the conservative tar-
get, whereas participants in the ‘‘dissimilar from liberal’’
group demonstrated greater dorsal mPFC engagement
while judging the liberal target. This region of dorsal
mPFC was the only area that showed greater activation
for dissimilar than similar targets. Confirming that these
two mPFC regions responded differently as a function of
target similarity, we observed a highly significant three-
way interaction for region (ventral mPFC, dorsal mPFC)3
Table 1. Coordinates of Peak Activations and Percent Signal
Change for Regions Demonstrating a Significantly Different BOLD
Response for Similar and Dissimilar Targets
Anatomical Label x y z Similar Dissimilar
Similar > dissimilar
Ventral mPFC 18 57 9 0.18 20.11
R inferior
frontal gyrus
51 3 24 0.85 0.39
Cingulate cortex 23 3 36 0.95 0.45
R occipital cortex 12 266 26 0.89 0.43
9 290 24 0.77 0.24
L occipital cortex 224 266 24 0.18 20.08
Dissimilar > similar
Dorsal mPFC 29 45 42 0.57 0.82
Peak activations are reported for each region in the Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute stereotaxic space. The two rightmost columns pres-
ent percent signal change as a function of the perceived similarity of
targets. For the purposes of reporting percent signal change in each
of these regions, the liberal target was considered ‘‘similar’’ and the
conservative target was considered ‘‘dissimilar’’ for participants in
the ‘‘similar-to-liberal’’ group (and vice versa for participants in the
‘‘dissimilar-from-liberal’’ group). mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex;
R = right; L = left.target (liberal, conservative) 3 participant group (sim-
ilar to liberal, dissimilar from liberal), F(1,13) = 26.06,
p < 0.0002.
These findings were further supported by correlational
analyses that capitalized on the full range of variability in
participants’ IAT results. As displayed in Figure 3A, the
activation in ventral mPFC during judgments of the lib-
eral target (relative to the conservative target) was signif-
icantly correlated with the extent to which a participant
associated self with the liberal target on the postscan-
ning IAT, r(14) = 0.54, p < 0.04. That is, the more a partic-
ipant associated self with the liberal target (as measured
by the IAT), the greater the difference in ventral mPFC ac-
tivation during judgments of the liberal target relative to
judgments of the conservative target. The inverse pat-
tern was observed in dorsal mPFC (Figure 3B), such
that the relative activity during judgments of the liberal
target was negatively correlated with the extent to which
a participant associated self with the liberal other on the
IAT, r(14) =20.72, p < 0.003. That is, the less a participant
associated self with the liberal target, the greater the dif-
ference in dorsal mPFC activation during judgments of
the liberal target (relative to judgments of the conserva-
tive target). In other words, whereas the response in ven-
tral mPFC tracked how similar the participants consid-
ered themselves to a target, the response in dorsal
mPFC tracked with how dissimilar participants consid-
ered themselves from a target.
Finally, we examined the overlap between self and
other through a separate analysis in which judgments
of others were reconditionalized on the basis of the dis-
tance between response to other and response for self.
We reasoned that participants were relatively likely to
have used knowledge about their own opinions and pre-
dilections when making the same response for a target
as for themselves (e.g., judging that a target looked for-
ward to returning home for Thanksgiving as much as
they themselves did). Accordingly, judgments of the
two targets were segregated into (1) those for which
Neuron
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for self (other-same trials) and (2) those for which the
participant made a different judgment for the other
than for self (other-different trials). As displayed in Fig-
ure 4, activation of ventral mPFC was nearly identical
during judgments of self and other-same judgments,
[t(14) = 0.29, ns], but both of these trial types engaged
ventral mPFC significantly more than other-different
judgments (both t values > 3.12, both p values < 0.01).
This additional analysis provides further support for
the notion that the ventral mPFC may be engaged
when using knowledge about oneself to mentalize about
others. Although a numerical trend in the opposite direc-
tion was observed in dorsal mPFC, the comparable
analysis in this region did not yield significant results.
Discussion
These results begin the process of identifying function-
ally discrete subregions of mPFC, suggesting that dis-
Figure 3. Scatter Plots Displaying the Relation between BOLD
Response and IAT Difference Score in mPFC for Each Participant
The x axes display the difference of the parameter estimate associ-
ated with liberal trials minus the parameter estimate associated with
conservative trials (thus, greater values indicate greater activation
during judgments of the liberal target). The y axes display the IAT dif-
ference score calculated the same way as described in Figure 1
(higher values indicate stronger association with the liberal target).
Each point represents one participant. (A) In ventral mPFC, the dif-
ference in BOLD response between liberal and conservative targets
was positively correlated with the strength of association between
self and the liberal target. That is, participants who associated them-
selves most with the liberal target also showed the largest relative
BOLD response in this ventral region during judgments of the liberal
target. (B) In contrast, in dorsal mPFC the difference in BOLD re-
sponse between liberal and conservative targets was negatively
correlated with the strength of association between self and the lib-
eral target. That is, participants who associated themselves most
with the liberal target also showed the smallest relative BOLD re-
sponse in this dorsal region during judgments of the liberal target.tinct dorsal and ventral sections of the medial wall of
prefrontal cortex subserve social-cognitive processing
as a function of how similar another person is perceived
to be to oneself. A ventral region of mPFC—overlapping
with earlier studies that have implicated this region in
self-referential processing (Gusnard et al., 2001; John-
son et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004;
Schmitz et al., 2004; Vogeley et al., 2004; Zysset et al.,
2002)—was more strongly engaged during judgments
about the potential mental states of others perceived
to be similar to versus dissimilar from oneself. In con-
trast, a more dorsal region of mPFC—more consistent
with the bulk of studies that have identified regions acti-
vated by mentalizing tasks—demonstrated the opposite
effect of being more strongly engaged during judgments
about the potential mental states of others perceived to
be dissimilar from oneself. This double dissociation was
obtained despite measuring target similarity through an
unrelated behavioral measure that was administered
postscanning and which simply assessed the relative
speed with which participants associated first-person
pronouns with photographs of the two target individ-
uals. Moreover, secondary analyses demonstrated that
ventral mPFC was similarly engaged for judgments
about oneself and judgments of others who were
thought to share the same opinion as the participant
on a particular question.
This functional division has not been evident in the
sizeable number of studies that have linked mPFC activ-
ity to social cognition, which have generally linked men-
talizing to relatively dorsal aspects of mPFC. By and
large, however, these studies have asked participants
to mentalize about targets that they were unlikely to per-
ceive as similar to self, such as historical figures (Goel
et al., 1995), cartoon and story characters (Fletcher
et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003), and abstract shapes (Castelli et al., 2000). As
such, these earlier studies may have inadvertently iso-
lated a subregion of mPFC that contributes specifically
to mentalizing about relatively dissimilar others. Inter-
estingly, the small number of studies that have reported
ventral mPFC engagement during mentalizing tasks
have typically included targets that were known to be
similar to participants (Kumaran and Maguire, 2005;
Figure 4. Responses in Ventral mPFC as a Function of the Overlap
between Behavioral Judgments of Self and Other
Response in ventral mPFC during self trials, ‘‘other-same’’ targets
that were given the same response as for oneself, and ‘‘other-differ-
ent’’ targets that were given a different response from oneself.
Whereas the response in this region was similar for self and other-
same trials, the response to both of these trial types was signifi-
cantly greater than for other-different trials.
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the context of computer-based games in which players
may adopt the first-person perspective of their oppo-
nents (Gallagher et al., 2002; McCabe et al., 2001). Ma-
nipulating the similarity of targets within a single exper-
iment provided the opportunity to observe this
dissociation between ventral and dorsal subregions of
mPFC.
A recent study by Saxe and Wexler (2005) also in-
cluded a manipulation that would have likely altered
the perceived similarity of targets. In this study, partici-
pants made mentalizing judgments about targets that
were described as having social and cultural back-
grounds that were either ‘‘familiar’’ or ‘‘foreign.’’ Intrigu-
ingly, these researchers report that activation in a region
of mPFC was marginally greater (p < 0.10) for targets
with foreign than familiar backgrounds, suggesting
that this region responds more to dissimilar than similar
others. However, although the ‘‘representative’’ region
displayed by the authors from a single participant sug-
gests that this effect was observed in dorsal aspects
of mPFC (consistent with the current results), these au-
thors do not report analyses that would permit a more
detailed comparison between their data and the results
of the current study.
In an earlier paper (Mitchell et al., 2005a), we demon-
strated a similar modulation of ventral mPFC activity as
a function of perceived similarity between self and other.
In that paper, participants either made mentalizing
(‘‘how pleased was this person to have her [or his] pho-
tograph taken?’’) or nonmentalizing (‘‘how symmetrical
is this face?’’) judgments about a large number of tar-
gets. After scanning, participants saw each of the faces
a second time and were asked to indicate how similar or
dissimilar the target was to themselves. These post-
scanning ratings were used to identify a region of the
ventral mPFC in which activity correlated with these
subsequent similarity ratings (higher activity for more
similar targets), but only for targets initially encountered
as part of the mentalizing task. Although this earlier
study is important for demonstrating that perceived
self-other similarity is only relevant when making
social-cognitive judgments about another’s mental states,
the current study extends this earlier work in several crit-
ical ways. First, the manipulation of the targets’ political
views in the current study better specified the way in
which perceivers saw themselves as similar or dissimilar
from each target (in the previous study, participants
were free to use whatever dimension of similarity they
saw fit, whereas here we fixed sociopolitical attitudes
as the relevant dimension of similarity). More impor-
tantly, the current results reveal a full double dissociation
between ventral and dorsal mPFC, thereby strengthen-
ing the empirical case for a division of labor in mPFC
contributions to mentalizing. This double dissociation
also rules out the possibility of an item effect, whereby
some targets were simply more likely to be seen as sim-
ilar by all participants, since the same targets engaged
different subregions of mPFC as a function of the
between-subject group to which a participant was later
assigned.
These data suggest the plausibility of simulation ac-
counts of social cognition, which posit that an under-
standing of another’s mind can be informed throughfirst-person experience of one’s own. Several variants
of simulation have been discussed in the context of so-
cial cognition. The term was originally introduced by
theorists to refer to circumstances in which one infers
another’s thoughts or feelings by mentally imagining
oneself in the same situation as a target (Adolphs,
2002; Davies and Stone, 1995a, 1995b; Gallese and
Goldman, 1998; Gordon, 1992; Heal, 1986; Meltzoff
and Brooks, 2001; Nickerson, 1999). Recently, the idea
of simulation has been expanded to include the related,
but distinct, phenomenon of mentalizing by placing one-
self in the same bodily state as a target, for example, by
displaying the same facial expression, potentiating the
same motor response, or activating the same brain re-
gions as another person (Gallese and Goldman, 1998).
Although these recently introduced ‘‘resonance’’ (or
‘‘mirror’’) versions of simulation provide a useful account
for how perceivers might infer the emotional experience
or predict the actions of others with whom they are inter-
acting, they are necessarily limited to those situations in
which visual or auditory cues about the target’s mental
states are available (i.e., an individual can directly see
or hear the target of mentalizing). Moreover, such reso-
nance-based simulation is useful only when perceptual
cues successfully communicate information about the
relevant internal states of the targets; certain mental
states—such as the kinds of attitudes and stable predi-
lections that our participants were asked to judge from
prelearned knowledge about a target—cannot be in-
ferred on the basis of mirroring another’s current physi-
cal states. Instead, we suggest that the results of the
current study are consistent with the possibility that per-
ceivers make selective use of simulation in the original
sense, plumbing their own possible—but not necessar-
ily concurrently experienced—thoughts and feelings for
clues to those of others.
Of course, targets perceived to be highly similar to
oneself are also likely to differ from dissimilar others in
a number of other important ways. We have long known
that familiar objects are evaluated more positively than
novel ones (Zajonc, 1968), an effect that extends to other
people (Monin, 2003). Consistent with this view, on
a second postscanning IAT designed to measure asso-
ciations between each target and affectively laden
words (paradise, cockroach), participants demon-
strated greater positivity toward the similar relative to
the dissimilar target, F(1,13) = 4.91, p < 0.05; for exam-
ple, participants in the ‘‘similar to liberal’’ group re-
sponded more quickly to trials within blocks in which
the liberal target was paired with positive words than
negative words. Unsurprisingly, correlational analyses
revealed that the two IAT measures were significantly re-
lated, r(14) = 0.56, p < 0.05. Moreover, activity in ventral
mPFC was correlated with the evaluation IAT in the
same way that it was correlated with the identity IAT;
that is, the strength of activation to the liberal (relative
to the conservative) target was significantly related to
the strength of positivity to the liberal target, r(14) =
0.58, p < 0.05. The comparability of the relation between
ventral mPFC activation and both IAT measures sug-
gests that it could be positivity—rather than similar-
ity—that differentiates ventral from dorsal mPFC contri-
butions to mentalizing. However, this possibility is
challenged by a failure to obtain any significant relation
Neuron
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is, unlike the strong inverse correlation obtained be-
tween dorsal mPFC activity and the identity IAT, no sig-
nificant relation with the evaluation IAT was observed in
dorsal mPFC, r(14) = 20.28, ns. Moreover, the alterna-
tive interpretation for the observed mPFC dissociation
is undermined by recent demonstrations (Moran et al.,
2006) that, while ventral mPFC is differentially engaged
by the degree of self-relevant processing, its activity
does not correlate with affective/emotion-based pro-
cessing per se (which seems to engage a more posterior
and ventral region of anterior cingulate cortex). Finally,
we note that the current results are inconsistent with
the view that ventral mPFC activity tracks with affective
processing, since the correlation we observed was spe-
cific for the relative degree of positivity that was demon-
strated toward a target individual, not the overall amount
of affect associated with the person. As such, the overall
pattern of results is more consistent with the view that
ventral and dorsal mPFC are differentially sensitive to
the perceived similarity between oneself and the target
of mentalizing than differences in positive and negative
evaluation of targets. However, cleaving the tight rela-
tion between the similarity of a target and the positivity
felt toward that person remains a significant challenge
in research of this kind.
Recent work by Vo¨llm et al. (2006) has suggested that
ventral mPFC may be particularly engaged when per-
ceivers make inferences about the affective aspects of
another person’s mental states (e.g., feelings, desires,
and motivations), whereas dorsal mPFC subserves in-
ferences about both affective as well as ‘‘colder,’’
more cognitive mental states, such as beliefs and
knowledge. Interestingly, the extant behavioral studies
that most strongly support simulationist accounts of
mentalizing have almost uniformly examined affective
mentalizing (Mitchell, 2005), suggesting a link between
these authors’ proposal that ventral mPFC may contrib-
ute specifically to mentalizing about affective states and
the current suggestion that this region contributes to
mentalizing via self reference. For example, Niedenthal
and colleagues (Niedenthal et al., 2001; 2000) have dem-
onstrated that observers’ own emotional state strongly
colors their judgments of others’ emotions (e.g., sad ob-
servers more readily perceive sadness in ambiguous fa-
cial displays than happy observers), except when pre-
vented from spontaneously mimicking the facial
expression of the person being judged. Likewise, sup-
port for the hypothesis that perceivers should reserve
self-referential processes for mentalizing about similar
others—and that this effect might be especially pro-
nounced for affective mentalizing—has come from dem-
onstrations that observers assume that outgroup mem-
bers do not experience the same depth of emotional
experience that they do themselves (Demoulin et al.,
2004; Vaes et al., 2003) and more readily project their
own goals and predilections onto similar targets than
dissimilar ones (Ames, 2004). As in this earlier research,
participants in the current study were specifically asked
about the likes, dislikes, and attitudinal opinions of
targets.
In contrast, much of the data marshalled against the
possibility that humans infer each others’ mental experi-
ence through the exclusive use of simulation has inves-tigated mentalizing about more cognitive mental states,
such as beliefs and knowledge. In her recent review of
behavioral evidence that weighs against simulation ac-
counts, Saxe (2005) points out a number of situations
in which mentalizing performance is unlikely to be self-
referential. Each of these is limited to mentalizing about
beliefs and knowledge. For example, Ruffman (1996)
has demonstrated that young children do not appear
to engage in simulation when inferring another person’s
knowledge; instead, children appear to assume that a re-
spondent who is ignorant of the color of a randomly cho-
sen bead will systematically answer incorrectly, which is
inconsistent with the simulationist prediction that per-
ceivers should know that respondents would actually
be agnostic about the actual state of affairs. This formu-
lation suggests that the use of self-reference to under-
stand others’ mental states may depend, in part, on
the particular mental states that need to be inferred
(Mitchell, 2005); whereas affective mentalizing may
draw heavily on self-reference, mentalizing about beliefs
and knowledge may rely on a different set of cognitive
processes (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). That such a di-
chotomy between affective and cognitive mentalizing
may exist is a contribution to our understanding of social
cognition made uniquely by recent neuroimaging re-
search, and suggests an important avenue for future in-
vestigations into the apparent link between self-refer-
ence, affective mentalizing, and the ventral mPFC.
Lastly, we point out the potential relevance of this
work for understanding the nature of outgroup stereo-
typing and prejudice. Earlier social psychological re-
search has suggested that perceivers tend to ‘‘infrahu-
manize’’ members of other groups by proving unwilling
to acknowledge that outgroup members can experience
certain higher-order mental states, such as the second-
order emotions of love and guilt (Demoulin et al., 2004;
Vaes et al., 2003). To the extent that members of a social
group other than one’s own are viewed as dissimilar
from oneself, the current results suggest that perceivers
may actively deploy a different set of social-cognitive
processes when considering the mental states of some-
one of a different race or ethnicity than a member of
one’s own ingroup. As such, prejudice may arise in
part because perceivers assume that outgroup mem-
bers’ mental states do not correspond to their own
and, accordingly, mentalize in a non-self-referential
way about the minds of people from different groups.
Without a self-referential basis for mentalizing about
outgroup members, perceivers may rely heavily on pre-
computed judgments—such as stereotypes—to make
mental state inferences about very dissimilar others.
This view suggests that a critical strategy for reducing
prejudice may be to breach arbitrary boundaries based
on social group membership by focusing instead on
the shared similarity between oneself and outgroup
members.
Experimental Procedures
Participants
Participants were 15 (nine male) right-handed, native English
speakers with no history of neurological problems (mean age, 24.4
years; range, 21–29). All participants were undergraduate or gradu-
ate students at universities in the Boston area. Informed consent
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661was obtained in a manner approved by the Human Studies Commit-
tee of the Massachusetts General Hospital.
Stimuli and Behavioral Procedure
Participants were told that we were investigating their ability to ex-
trapolate another person’s opinions, likes, and dislikes from a small
amount of information about that person. Prior to scanning, partici-
pants were introduced to two target individuals, represented by face
photographs downloaded from an Internet dating site. Each target
face was accompanied by a short descriptive paragraph intended
to create a sense of similarity between the participant and one target
and dissimilarity between the participant and the other target. For
one target (randomly determined for each participant), this para-
graph described the person as having liberal sociopolitical views
and participating in activities typical of many students at Northeast
liberal arts colleges. For the other target, the paragraph described
the person as a fundamentalist Christian with conservative political
and social views who participated avidly in a variety of events spon-
sored by religious and Republican organizations at a Midwest uni-
versity. Participants were told that we had generated these descrip-
tions from information provided by the target individuals on an
Internet dating site, and that we would subsequently ask them to
use what they learned about each target to judge that person’s opin-
ions, likes, and dislikes. Order of presentation (liberal target first;
conservative target first) was randomized across participants, and
the two targets were matched to the sex of the participant (i.e.,
male participants read about two men; female participants read
about two women). Participants were given as much time as needed
to read about each of the two targets.
During the subsequent scanning phase, participants judged how
likely targets were to agree with each of 66 opinion questions.
Each trial began with the appearance of a four-point response scale
(anchored by ‘‘1 = definitely not’’ and ‘‘4 = definitely’’) below one of
three targets: (1) the photograph of the liberal target used during
learning, (2) the photograph of the conservative target used during
learning, or (3) a chalk outline of a person’s head with the word
‘‘me’’ written inside (used to indicate the subject himself or herself).
After 1 s, an opinion question appeared between the face and the re-
sponse scale, and participants were asked to use the scale either to
judge how likely the target was to agree with the question or, on trials
when the target was oneself, to indicate how much they personally
agreed with the question. Questions referred to a wide range of per-
sonal and societal issues (e.g., ‘‘to look forward to going home for
Thanksgiving?’’; ‘‘to enjoy having a roommate from a different coun-
try?’’; ‘‘to drive a small car entirely for environmental reasons?’’; ‘‘to
think that European films are generally better than the ones made in
Hollywood?’’; ‘‘to believe that cultural diversity should be an impor-
tant national issue?’’; etc.). The face, question, and scale remained
onscreen together for an additional 3 s, during which time partici-
pants were obliged to make their response. To increase their en-
gagement with the task, participants were told that we knew about
the targets’ actual opinions and predilections from questionnaires
that they had filled out at the dating web site, and that we were inter-
ested in how accurately participants could infer those characteris-
tics in each target; in actual fact, all the information presented was
generated specifically for this experiment. Target photographs
were resized to a width between 5.54 and 6.35 cm and a height be-
tween 6.77 and 8.12 cm. To optimize estimation of the event-related
fMRI response, trials were intermixed in a pseudorandom order and
separated by a variable interstimulus interval (500—7500 ms) (Dale,
1999), during which participants passively viewed a fixation cross-
hair.
Approximately 10 min after completing the last functional run, par-
ticipants completed a version of the Implicit Association Test
(Greenwald et al., 1998) that was designed to measure how similar
they perceived themselves to be to each of the two targets. The
IAT assesses the conceptual association between two classes of
stimuli by measuring differences in the speed with which partici-
pants can make the same behavioral response to exemplars from
two categories (e.g., pressing the same button for pictures of snakes
and positively-valenced words compared to pressing the same but-
ton for snakes and negatively-valenced words). On each trial of the
identity IAT used in the current study, participants categorized an
exemplar from one of four categories of stimuli: a photo of the liberaltarget, a photo of the conservative target, a first-person pronoun
(me, mine, or my), or a third-person pronoun (they, theirs, or they).
In one block of trials, words related to self (i.e., first-person pro-
nouns) required the same behavioral response as photos of the lib-
eral target (self-with-liberal block); specifically, participants re-
sponded with the left key (‘‘d’’) for first-person pronouns or the
photo of the liberal target and responded with the right key (‘‘k’’)
for third-person pronouns or the photo of the conservative target.
In another block of trials, words related to self required the same re-
sponse as photos of the conservative target (self-with-conservative
block); in this block, participants responded with the left key for first-
person pronouns or the photo of the conservative target and the
right key for third-person pronouns or the photo of the liberal target.
IAT data were coded in the direction of association between self and
the liberal target, that is, as the difference in mean response latency
to trials in the self-with-conservative block minus trials in the self-
with-liberal block. As such, higher IAT difference scores indicate
greater association between self and the liberal target. Each block
consisted of 60 trials (15 each of the four trial types), and block order
(self-with-liberal first; self-with-conservative first) was randomized
across participants.
After this task, participants completed a second IAT that was de-
signed to assess the strength of their evaluations (positivity versus
negativity) toward each target. The procedure for this evaluation
IAT was identical to that of the identity IAT above, except that first-
and third-person pronouns were replaced with positive and negative
words. The strength of positivity toward the liberal target was calcu-
lated as the difference in average response latency to trials within
the negative-with-liberal block minus positive-with-liberal block.
Following conventional treatment of reaction time data (Fazio,
1990; Ratcliff, 1993), IAT data were log-transformed prior to statisti-
cal analysis. A trial was excluded from analysis if either (1) the partic-
ipant incorrectly categorized the stimulus or (2) its response latency
was more than three standard deviations from the participant’s own
mean. These criteria resulted in the exclusion of 6.0% of IAT trials.
Reanalysis of these data using the IAT scoring procedures recom-
mended by Greenwald et al. (2003) did not qualify any of the reported
results.
Finally, participants were asked two questions regarding their ex-
plicit sociopolitical attitudes: (1) ‘‘On a scale from 1–7, how socially
liberal or conservative would you say you are?’’ and (2) ‘‘On a scale
from 1–7, how politically liberal or conservative would you say you
are?’’ The two questions were presented in random order, and par-
ticipants responded to each using a seven-point Likert-type scale,
anchored by 1 = extremely liberal; 4 = neither liberal nor conserva-
tive; 7 = extremely conservative. These self-report measures were
included only to assess the explicit attitudes of our participant pop-
ulation and were not used to qualify fMRI results. Almost all partici-
pants expressed liberal attitudes; indeed, only three participants
used a point above the midline to describe their sociopolitical atti-
tudes. This lack of variability precluded the use of this self-report
measure as a covariate for fMRI data analysis.
Imaging Procedure
Imaging was conducted using a 1.5 Tesla Siemens Sonata scanner.
We first collected a high-resolution T1-weighted structural scan
(MP-RAGE) followed by three functional runs of 172 volume acquisi-
tions (26 axial slices; 5 mm thick; 1 mm skip). Functional scanning
used a gradient-echo echo-planar pulse sequence (TR = 2 s; TE =
35 ms; 3.75 3 3.75 in-plane resolution). Using PsyScope software
(Cohen et al., 1993) for Macintosh OS X, stimuli were projected
onto a screen at the end of the magnet bore that participants viewed
by way of a mirror mounted on the head coil. A pillow and foam cush-
ions were placed inside the head coil to minimize head movements.
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM99 (Well-
come Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). First, func-
tional data were time corrected for differences in acquisition time
between slices for each whole-brain volume and realigned to correct
for head movement. Functional data were then transformed into
a standard anatomical space (3 mm isotropic voxels) based on the
ICBM 152 brain template (Montreal Neurological Institute). Normal-
ized data were then spatially smoothed (8 mm full-width-at-half-
maximum [FWHM]) using a Gaussian kernel. Trials were conditional-
ized as a function of which target was being judged (liberal,
Neuron
662conservative). Statistical analyses were performed using the general
linear model in which the event-related design was modeled using
a canonical hemodynamic response function, its temporal deriva-
tive, and additional covariates of no interest (a session mean and
a linear trend). This analysis was performed individually for each par-
ticipant, and contrast images for each participant were subse-
quently entered in a second-level analysis which treated partici-
pants as a random effect and used participant group (similar to
liberal, dissimilar from liberal) as a between-subject factor. As
such, comparisons of interest identified brain regions demonstrat-
ing a two-way interaction of target (liberal, conservative) 3 partici-
pant group (similar to liberal, dissimilar from liberal). Peak coordi-
nates were identified using a statistical criterion of 130 or more
contiguous voxels at a voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.01. This cluster
size was selected on the basis of a Monte Carlo simulation (S. Slot-
nick, Boston College) of our brain volume that found that this cluster
extent cutoff provided an experiment-wise threshold of p < 0.05,
corrected for multiple comparisons.
In a secondary analysis, trials were reconditionalized as (1) self,
i.e., judgments about oneself; (2) other-same, i.e., either a liberal
or conservative target on which, for a particular opinion question,
the participant made the same response to self and other; and (3)
other-different, i.e., either a liberal or conservative target on which
the participant made a different response for self and other. Re-
gion-of-interest analyses of the difference between these trial types
were conducted on the mPFC regions observed from the primary
analysis using analysis-of-variance procedures on the parameter
estimates associated with each trial type.
Although analysis of behavioral data suggested that reaction time
was highly unlikely to account for any of the neuroimaging results we
report, we also performed a supplementary analysis in which partic-
ipants’ trial-by-trial reaction time during the mentalizing task was
used as a covariate in analysis of fMRI data. Specifically, we fit
a model in which the reaction time associated with each trial was in-
cluded as a linear parametric modulator. A random-effects analysis
was then used to reveal brain regions in which BOLD response was
correlated with reaction time: this analysis revealed a number of
areas in visual cortex and language-related regions (which fre-
quently covary with reading time), but did not demonstrate any re-
gions in mPFC. More critically, we also directly examined how well
reaction time predicted the BOLD response in our particular regions
of interest. This analysis was conducted on the parameter estimate
associated with the linear relation between reaction time and BOLD
response in each of the regions observed from the primary random-
effects analyses. Consistent with the above analysis, reaction time
was significantly related to the BOLD response only in occipital cor-
tex, but was not related to the response in either ventral mPFC (p =
0.33) or dorsal mPFC (p = 0.21).
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